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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In a 1943 Columbia Law Review article, legal scholar Friedrich Kessler addressed 
freedom of contract—a bastion of contract law that justifies both treating contracts 
as exclusively “private affair[s]” and limiting courts to interpreting, not creating, 
contractual terms.1 Kessler posited that, when an individual contracts with a large-
scale enterprise, freedom of contract is an illusion because the parties’ vastly unequal 
bargaining power allows the enterprise to impose contractual terms on the individual.2 
This disparity, coupled with the rise of “standardized mass contract[s],”3 meant that 
enterprises could “legislate by contract  .  .  . in a substantially authoritarian manner 
without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”4 And consumers in particular 
were faced with accepting an enterprise’s unilaterally prescribed terms or forgoing 
needed goods and services.5
 Kessler warned that this new kind of contract—the adhesion contract6—if left 
unregulated in the hands of “industrial and commercial overlords,”7 would lead to 
abuse of power to the detriment of individual consumers and the public at large.8 
Kessler argued that judges had to accept that sometimes “legal certainty and sound 
principles of contract law [like freedom of contract] should  .  .  . be sacrificed to 
dictates of justice or social desirability.”9 Only then could the judiciary recognize 
that standardized contracts (particularly adhesion contracts) were a different breed 
1. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 
629, 630 (1943). Kessler was an authority on contract law who f led Nazi Germany in 1934 and taught 
for most of his decades-long career at Yale Law School. George L. Priest, Contracts Then and Now: An 
Appreciation of Friedrich Kessler, 104 Yale L.J. 2145, 2146 (1995); Friedrich Kessler, 96, Law Professor, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/09/nyregion/friedrich-kessler-96-law-
professor.html.
2. Kessler, supra note 1, at 640.
3. Id. at 631 (“The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and mass distribution 
made a new type of contract inevitable—the standardized mass contract.”).
4. Id. at 640.
5. See id. at 632.
6. See id. At the time of Kessler’s writing, “the term ‘contract of adhesion’ . . . ha[d] not even found general 
recognition in our legal vocabulary.” Id. at 633. Kessler attributed the term to a Harvard Law Review 
article published in 1919. Id. at 632 n.11 (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance 
Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 222 (1919)). Contract of adhesion—or adhesion contract—refers to:
[A] standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the 
acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power 
between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the second 
party on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, without opportunity for bargaining and under such 
conditions that the ‘adherer’ cannot obtain the desired product or service save by 
acquiescing in the form agreement.
 Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1962).
7. Kessler, supra note 1, at 640. 
8. Id. at 641.
9. Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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requiring different applications of contract law, and that the courts had a responsibility 
to adapt the common law to protect weaker parties.10
 The good news is that, since his article was published in 1943, “Kessler’s approach 
has prevailed . . . [and] [o]ur courts have become self-conscious social engineers” that 
consider economic realities when shaping the law.11 As technological and industrial 
progress led to increased mass production, and forces of capitalism funneled smaller 
entities into horizontally and vertically integrated oligopolies,12 the courts have 
adjusted contract law to account for “differential economic power, the allocation of 
risks in the context of unequal bargaining ability, and relative informational 
advantages.”13 The bad news is that U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements14 have resurrected inequities that had been 
more or less extinguished under the common law. These decisions have expanded 
the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), giving enterprises 
renewed power to “legislate by contract” through the use of arbitration agreements in 
adhesion contracts. As Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant illustrates:
The owner of a small restaurant  .  .  . thinks that [an enterprise] has used its 
monopoly power to force merchants to accept a form contract violating the 
antitrust laws. The restaurateur wants to challenge the allegedly unlawful 
provision[,]  .  .  . but the same contract’s arbitration clause prevents him from 
doing so. That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would make 
pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. So if the arbitration clause is 
enforceable, [the enterprise] has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if 
it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to 
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.
And here is the nutshell version of [the Supreme Court’s majority] opinion, 
admirably f launted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.15
 This note contends that the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the preemptive 
reach of the FAA, culminating in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,16 allow 
enterprises to use mandatory individual-arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts 
to insulate themselves from consumer claim liability because such agreements force 
10. See id. at 638.
11. Priest, supra note 1, at 2151.
12. See generally Louis Galambos, The U.S. Corporate Economy in the Twentieth Century, in 3 The Cambridge 
Economic History of the United States: The Twentieth Century 927, 927–67 (Stanley L. 
Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000).
13. Priest, supra note 1, at 2151.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 18–30 for an explanation of arbitration and arbitration agreements.
15. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Elena Kagan was responding 
to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in a case involving a mandatory arbitration provision that 
prevented the vindication of federal statutory rights. See id. But Justice Kagan’s characterization applies 
with equal force to the Court’s decisions on Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption.
16. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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consumers to either pursue claims individually (which is rarely cost-effective) or 
abandon them entirely.17 Part II of this note provides a brief description of arbitration 
and the history of the FAA. Part III explains how Concepcion expanded the FAA’s 
preemptive reach; how this expansion limits the application of the common law of 
contracts in addressing economic realities; and how, as a result, enterprises can now 
effectively contract around consumer liability. Part IV argues that Congress should 
amend the FAA to grant states the authority to legislate the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements, thereby restoring the balance between freedom of contract 
and consumer protection.
ii. arbitratiOn and thE fEdEraL arbitratiOn aCt
 Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution in which parties appoint a 
neutral decisionmaker (an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators) to adjudicate their 
dispute.18 Arbitration is similar to litigation in that it is adversarial, the parties make 
legal arguments supported by evidence, and a final decision is issued in favor of one 
side.19 But unlike litigation, private arbitration is consensual: The parties must agree 
to arbitrate.20 As such, the parties exercise control over the size and shape of the 
arbitration,21 including what issues are arbitrable,22 the selection of the arbitrator(s),23 
and the formality of the proceedings.24 Arbitration also differs from litigation in that 
arbitrators are generally not bound by precedent,25 and arbitration awards are final 
and binding—that is, they cannot be appealed for review on the merits.26
17. See infra text accompanying notes 86–89.
18. Jay E. Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 6:1 (3d ed. 2005).
19. See Leonard L. Riskin et al., Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 553 (4th ed. 2009).
20. Id. at 554. Parties can agree to arbitrate after a dispute arises or in advance by including an arbitration 
clause in their contract. Id. This note focuses on contractual agreements to arbitrate, but litigants can 
also find themselves in court-ordered arbitration, which has different characteristics. See id. at 774–75 
(describing court-annexed non-binding arbitration).
21. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (“[P]arties are generally free to 
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”); Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 554.
22. Parties can agree to arbitrate all disputes arising between them or to limit arbitration to certain topics. 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[Parties] may agree to limit 
the issues arbitrated . . . .”); see also Grenig, supra note 18, § 7:1 (“A party may be required to arbitrate 
only those disputes that the party has agreed to submit to arbitration.”).
23. Parties can name the arbitrator(s) in the arbitration agreement or instead provide for a procedure for 
selecting the arbitrator(s). Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 554; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 683 
(“[Parties] may choose who will resolve specific disputes.”).
24. Parties can agree whether and to what degree the rules of evidence shall apply. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 
U.S. at 683 (citation omitted) (“[P]arties . . . may agree on rules under which an arbitration will proceed.”).
25. See Grenig, supra note 18, § 6:2 (“Arbitrators do not have to follow the law, and there are fewer checks 
and balances.”). 
26. Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 554; see also Grenig, supra note 18, § 6:2 n.7 (“If [the state] allowed every 
alleged misinterpretation of an arbitration agreement by an arbitrator to be litigated and appealed[,] 
arbitrations would be a mere prelude to litigation and would, in the end, prove more time-consuming and 
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 Due to these differences, arbitration can be more expeditious and less expensive 
than litigation.27 Additionally, arbitration permits parties to choose a decisionmaker 
with experience and expertise in a particular industry or field,28 as well as maintain the 
confidentiality of the proceedings and outcome.29 These factors have made arbitration 
an increasingly attractive alternative to litigation, especially for enterprises in the 
consumer context, and in recent years the use of arbitration has increased exponentially, 
particularly with respect to commercial, employment, and consumer contracts.30
 The FAA is the principle statute governing arbitration.31 Congress adopted the 
FAA in 1925 to reverse what the Supreme Court has characterized as “centuries of 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”32 Under old English (and by adoption old 
American) common law, courts consistently refused to give effect to arbitration 
agreements, initially to avoid competition from a non-judicial forum and eventually as 
a matter of practice.33 As a result, parties with contractual agreements to arbitrate could 
never be certain that courts would enforce them.34
 To correct this mischief, Congress adopted the FAA and, in § 2’s saving clause, 
provided that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,  save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”35 
expensive than litigation.”). For arbitrations covered by the FAA, judicial review of arbitral awards is 
limited to narrow, specific circumstances. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2013); see also David St. John 
Sutton et al., Russell on Arbitration, 23d §§ 6-004 to -008 (2008). While parties may agree to 
non-binding arbitration depending on their circumstances and desired outcome, see, for example, Riskin 
et al., supra note 19, at 774–75 (discussing voluntary and non-binding court-annexed arbitration), this 
note and the Supreme Court cases discussed herein are concerned only with binding arbitration.
27. Grenig, supra note 18, § 6:2.
28. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (“Parties usually choose an arbitrator because 
they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations.”); 
Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 710–11.
29. Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 711.
30. Id. at 555; see also George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 665, 679–80 (2013) (citing statistics from the Bureau of 
National Affairs and the U.S. General Accounting Office, as well as independent studies showing 
increase in the use of arbitration agreements in commercial, employment, and consumer contracts).
31. See Riskin et al., supra note 19, at 563.
32. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974). This note adopts the Supreme Court’s history 
of the FAA because (1) the Court has repeatedly attempted to discern the intent of the 68th Congress 
from available sources and developed a consistent narrative for the interpretation of the FAA, and (2) as 
a practical matter, whether the Court is right or wrong about the statute’s history, it is the Court’s 
version that has ultimately controlled and shaped the FAA’s development.
33. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
34. “‘[T]he purpose of the [FAA] was to assure those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to 
interstate commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, or . . . by state 
courts or legislatures.’” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(Lumbard, C.J., concurring)).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013). The FAA also provides for federal court hearings to compel arbitration, id. § 4; an 
equivalent of subpoena power for arbitrators that allows them to summon witnesses and records, id. § 7; 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that § 2 ref lects a “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration”36 and has interpreted the FAA broadly to effectuate it.37 In 1984, 
the Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA requires federal and state 
courts to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms38 and 
preempts state laws that frustrate the FAA’s purpose of placing arbitration agreements 
“upon the same footing as other contracts.”39 The following year, in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the Court held that agreements to arbitrate federal 
statutory claims must be enforced under the FAA, absent evidence that Congress 
intended to preserve judicial remedies under the statute at issue.40 Then in 1995, the 
Court confirmed in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson that the FAA reaches the 
the vacating of awards in narrow, prescribed circumstances, such as where an award is fraudulent or an 
arbitrator exceeds his or her powers, id. § 10(a)(1)–(4); the entering of court judgments upon awards, id. 
§ 9; etc.
36. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1745 (2011); Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); EEOC v. Waff le 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 
(1991); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
37. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been primarily responsible for the development of the 
FAA since its enactment, as the statute itself has remained “substantially unchanged since 1925.” 
Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining In Judicial Expansion and 
Mandatory Use, 8 Nev. L.J. 385, 390 (2008).
38. 465 U.S. at 13 (noting that Congress “contemplated a broad reach of the [FAA], unencumbered by 
state-law constraints”); see also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (“It is 
well settled that the substantive law the [FAA] created is applicable in state and federal courts.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
39. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 
492 (holding that the FAA preempted a California statute allowing workers to bring wage-collection 
actions without regard to private arbitration agreements); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring arbitration agreements to be 
in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract in order to be enforceable).
40. 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) (“[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of 
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an 
alternative means of dispute resolution. . . . [T]he Act itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements 
to arbitrate statutory claims . . . .”). Additionally, “[t]he burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . 
to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at 
issue,” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987), and this burden is a heavy 
one. In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Court held that the language of the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA) did not evidence congressional intent to ensure a federal judicial forum. 132 
S. Ct. at 672–73. The CROA required credit repair organizations to inform consumers that they “have 
a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the [CROA].” Id. at 669 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that “most consumers would understand” that the 
language was merely “a colloquial method of communicating to consumers that they have the legal 
right” to hold credit repair organizations accountable, but that the CROA did not create a legal right to 
a judicial forum. Id. at 670, 672.
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fullest extent of congressional power under the commerce clause, in part, because the 
FAA “seeks broadly to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”41
 Notwithstanding the FAA’s expansive preemptive effect, the saving clause allows 
for the invalidation of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”42 Accordingly, “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability”—which are available 
under state contract law—may be used to invalidate arbitration agreements.43 But 
their application is not without restrictions. Under the FAA, states may not “singl[e] 
out arbitration provisions for suspect status,”44 and a “state law principle [may not 
take] its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue.”45 The 
Supreme Court has articulated the limitations of the saving clause as follows:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all 
its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that 
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly 
contrary to the [FAA]’s language and Congress’ [sic] intent.46
In short, since the 1980s the Court has consistently expanded the FAA’s preemptive 
effect and narrowed the circumstances under which arbitration agreements may be 
invalidated.47 And in 2011, the Court’s decision in Concepcion further expanded FAA 
preemption with respect to the common law of contracts.48
41. 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). The scope of the FAA has been interpreted as co-extensive with Congress’s 
commerce clause power because the act, by its terms, applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce  .  .  .  .” Id. at 273 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013)); see also Edward Brunet et al., 
Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment 66 (2006). 
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
43. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 
686–87 (“[S]tate law may be applied, ‘if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.’”)).
44. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
45. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
46. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281; accord Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458 
(2003) (“The central purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are  .  .  . 
[placed] upon the same footing as other contracts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Doctor’s Assocs., 
517 U.S. at 682 (“Montana’s [statute] directly conflicts with [the FAA] because the State’s law conditions 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not 
applicable to contracts generally.”). 
47. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court 
Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 129, 129 (2012); see also David S. Schwartz, 
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239, 243 (2012).
48. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
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iii.  EXpansiOn Of faa prEEMptiOn and dECLEnsiOn Of COnsUMEr 
prOtECtiOn
 Prior to Concepcion, it was clear that any state law directly conflicting with the 
FAA was preempted. “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a 
particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conf licting rule is 
displaced by the FAA.”49 The state law at issue in Concepcion, however, did not 
directly conflict with the FAA.50 Rather, the case concerned a common-law rule 
stating that arbitration agreements with collective-action waivers in certain consumer 
adhesion contracts were unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.51 The issue, 
then, was whether the application of a state common-law rule—in this case, the 
generally applicable contract defense of unconscionability—indirectly conflicted with 
the FAA such that the state law would be preempted.52
 Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased cell phone service from AT&T, which 
had been advertised as including free phones.53 As a condition of service, the 
Concepcions signed AT&T’s standard service agreement, which included a 
mandatory individual-arbitration clause.54 The Concepcions received phones, but 
AT&T charged them $30.22 in sales tax on the phones’ retail price, which the 
Concepcions argued was not “free.” 55 They filed a complaint in federal district court, 
which was consolidated with a class action alleging similar claims of false advertising 
and fraud.56 AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the service agreement,57 
whereas the Concepcions argued that the individual-arbitration clause was 
unconscionable and should not be enforced.58
49. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). The Court reaffirmed 
this holding ten months later in a three-page per curiam opinion. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. 
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012). There, the highest court of West Virginia had found that the FAA 
did not apply to personal injury or wrongful death claims and, as a matter of public policy, “held 
unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or 
wrongful death against nursing homes.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed the West Virginia Supreme 
Court on the grounds that its reasoning and decision were inconsistent with Concepcion. Id. at 1203–04.
50. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (“[T]he inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally 
thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to 
have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.”).
51. Id. at 1746. Recall that unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense (i.e., a recognized 
exception to the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA). See supra text accompanying 
notes 42–43.
52. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.




57. Id. at 1744–45.
58. Id. at 1745. The arbitration clause required arbitration in “the parties’ individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” Id. at 1744 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
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 To determine whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable, the Ninth 
Circuit applied the “Discover Bank rule,”59 which was a California common-law 
application of the unconscionability doctrine to collective-arbitration waivers in 
consumer adhesion contracts.60 Under California law, “[a] finding of unconscionability 
requires a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or 
surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided 
results.”61 Over time, this doctrine had evolved with respect to arbitration agreements 
and, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court synthesized 
the following rule: Unconscionability exists as a matter of law in cases where (1) a 
consumer adhesion contract contains a collective-arbitration waiver; (2) potential 
damages in disputes subject to the waiver “predictably involve small amounts of 
damages”; and (3) the consumer alleges that a party with greater bargaining power 
had “carried out a scheme” intending to cheat many consumers.62 Because the facts of 
Concepcion satisfied this rule, the Ninth Circuit found the arbitration agreement 
between the Concepcions and AT&T unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.63
 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Discover Bank rule was 
preempted because it conf licted with the FAA, albeit indirectly.64 The Court 
reasoned that, while the rule stemmed from the generally applicable defense of 
unconscionability, it (1) disproportionately impacted arbitration agreements65 and 
(2) failed to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms by effectively 
requiring class proceedings when the parties agreed to bilateral arbitration.66 Thus, 
the state rule was preempted because it conflicted with the FAA’s primary purpose 
59. Id. at 1745–46.
60. Id. at 1750.
61. Id. at 1746 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
63. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
64. See id. at 1753 (“Because it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress, California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
65. See id. at 1747 (“An obvious illustration of this point would be a case finding unconscionable  .  .  . 
consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery.  .  .  . In 
practice,  .  .  . the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; but it would 
presumably apply to contracts purporting to restrict discovery in litigation as well.”).
66. Id. at 1748–49. The Court reasoned that class arbitration is fundamentally different from bilateral 
arbitration because class arbitration: (1) requires greater formality, sacrificing the speed and lower costs 
of bilateral arbitration; (2) is not formal enough to adequately protect absent class members; and 
(3) burdens defendants with greater risk than they bargained for, in that they may find themselves in 
bet-the-company class adjudication without the possibility of review on the merits. Id. at 1750–52. 
Therefore, requiring class arbitration could not be reconciled with the parties’ agreement to arbitrate 
individually. Id. at 1752. This analysis was consistent with the Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen that the 
availability of class procedures could not be read into an arbitration agreement that was silent on the 
issue. Id. at 1750 (“[T]he ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action 
arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’” (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
686 (2010))).
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of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.67 The Court also 
observed that limiting the Discover Bank rule to adhesion contracts was not a 
limitation at all, given that “the times in which consumer contracts were anything 
other than adhesive are long past.”68 In short, although California contract law 
supported a finding of unconscionability, consistent with the substantive and 
procedural safeguards of its generally applicable unconscionability doctrine, the 
Concepcions were simply out of luck.
 With the addition of this expansive holding to the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, 
enterprises can now insulate themselves from consumer claim liability. It works like 
this: If an enterprise includes a bilateral-arbitration agreement in its consumer 
adhesion contract, the agreement will be enforced in all but the most extreme 
circumstances,69 thereby insulating the enterprise from collective consumer action; 
and the enforcement of the bilateral-arbitration agreement would in turn discourage 
consumers from pursuing independent claims, thereby insulating the enterprise from 
individual consumer action. That is, enterprises post–Concepcion have the power to 
contract around most consumer liability as a legal matter and any remaining liability 
as a practical matter.
 The hallmark of an adhesion contract is that one party has all the power to 
dictate the contract’s terms, while the other party must “take it or leave it.”70 Every 
consumer in today’s world of mass-produced, mass-marketed goods and services is 
familiar with this arrangement: If you want a bank account, insurance policy, 
computer, or cell phone, you must agree to the fine print. But this concept is hardly 
new. In his 1943 article, Kessler explained:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining 
power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in 
a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the 
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all 
competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection 
more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose 
consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all. Thus, 
standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion . . . .71
67. Id. at 1748.
68. Id. at 1750.
69. The generally applicable contract defenses of fraud, duress, and unconscionability are technically still 
available post–Concepcion, but it is unclear what type of conduct would be sufficiently egregious for a 
court to find an arbitration agreement unenforceable on those grounds.
70. Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1962) (“[Contract of adhesion] refers to a standardized 
contract prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, 
due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted 
or rejected by the second party on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, without opportunity for bargaining and 
under such conditions that the ‘adherer’ cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing 
in the form agreement.” (footnote omitted)).
71. Kessler, supra note 1, at 632. 
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 In theory, and often in practice, the use of standardized contracts is advantageous 
to both enterprises and consumers.72 Standardized contracts eliminate the need for 
individual negotiations, saving the parties time and money.73 Uniformity also allows 
enterprises to better mitigate risks, including those associated with litigation, which 
in turn reduces business costs.74 These cost savings are then passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower prices and “society as a whole ultimately benefits.”75
 This theory assumes that the dominant party will not take advantage of its 
position, either inadvertently or intentionally.76 Yet in reality, enterprises are expected 
to act to their advantage (and to consumers’ disadvantage);77 Congress and all fifty 
states have enacted various consumer protection laws in anticipation of such 
behavior.78 The FAA, by its own terms, recognizes that there are circumstances “as 
exist at law or in equity” where agreements to arbitrate should not be enforced.79 As 
previously discussed, the contract defenses of fraud, duress, and unconscionability 
serve as common-law rules of consumer protection: when faced with inequities 
resulting from disparate bargaining power and unilaterally imposed contractual 
terms, courts can use equitable remedies to protect the weaker party.80
 The FAA has always preempted state laws that directly interfere with the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements but, post–Concepcion, any state law that 
directly or indirectly interferes with the enforcement of arbitration agreements is 
preempted. For example, state statutes mandating the availability of class proceedings 
have always been preempted by the FAA.81 But Concepcion goes one step further by 
precluding courts from consistently applying generally available contract defenses—
72. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. a (1981).
73. See id.
74. Kessler, supra note 1, at 632 (“Standardized contracts have . . . become an important means of excluding 
or controlling the ‘irrational factor’ in litigation.”).
75. Id. 
76. See id. at 640.
77. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 377 (2005) (“[I]t [is] inevitable that firms will ultimately act in their 
economic best interests, and those interests dictate that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure 
to class action liability.”).
78. For example, all fifty states have statutory safeguards against deceptive trade practices, 50 State Statutory 
Surveys: Business Organizations: Consumer Protection—Deceptive Trade Practices, 0015 Survs. 6 (2007), 
and all fifty states and the federal government have restrictions on advertising and marketing practices, 
50 State Statutory Surveys: Financial Services: Loan Funding—Advertising and Marketing Restrictions, 
0090 Survs. 18 (2013).
79. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
80. See Priest, supra note 1, at 2151 (“Our courts have become self-conscious social engineers. The reality of 
differential market power, informational advantages, and relative risk-bearing abilities have become 
foundational elements of modern contractual interpretation.”).
81. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008) (“[W]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions 
arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or 
administrative, are superseded by the FAA.”).
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which by definition are generally applicable and therefore do not single out arbitration 
agreements—to invalidate mandatory arbitration provisions in adhesion contracts. 
While the defense of unconscionability is technically still available, a finding of 
unconscionability cannot rely on: (1) any inference derived from the fact that an 
arbitration agreement is at issue, such as the inference that enforcing the agreement 
would preclude meaningful relief; or (2) the fact that the arbitration agreement is a 
term in an adhesion contract, which courts often find persuasive in making 
unconscionability determinations.82 In this way, the Supreme Court has gone beyond 
placing arbitration agreements on “equal footing with other contracts”83 and, in fact, 
has placed arbitration agreements on superior footing.
 But the final nail in the coffin for the unconscionability defense is that, post–
Concepcion, courts are also prevented from consistently applying the defense in cases 
with substantially similar, or even identical, facts.84 To illustrate: A court is asked to 
decide whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable. It applies its jurisdiction’s 
unconscionability doctrine, finds that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, 
and refuses to enforce it. So far, so good. Subsequently, the court is confronted with 
a second case involving an allegedly unconscionable arbitration agreement. Because 
the second case is factually similar to the first, the court relies on its prior holding 
and accordingly refuses to enforce the second arbitration agreement. This pattern 
repeats itself until enough cases have been decided that the court and parties before 
the court can synthesize a rule (e.g., under X, Y, Z circumstances, arbitration 
agreements are unconscionable as a matter of law). Now there is a problem because, 
under Concepcion, the court is no longer applying the generally applicable contract 
defense of unconscionability. Rather, the court has created a common-law rule that 
disfavors arbitration agreements, and laws that disfavor arbitration agreements are 
preempted by the FAA.85 Ultimately, courts are precluded from relying on precedent 
to invalidate arbitration agreements and, by extension, from developing common-law 
rules in favor of consumers.
82. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
83. Id. at 1745 (“In line with [FAA] principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing 
with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms.” (citation omitted)).
84. See id. at 1747–48. Some scholars argue that Concepcion can be read narrowly: The Discover Bank rule 
was invalidated because it was overbroad and reduced the unconscionability analysis to a bright-line test. 
See, e.g., Jerett Yan, A Lunatic’s Guide to Suing for $30: Class Action Arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act 
and Unconscionability After AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 551, 558–59 (2011). 
But nothing in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence indicates that the Court would limit its holding 
in this fashion. The Court’s clear and consistent trend of expansively interpreting the FAA suggests that 
a broad reading of Concepcion is more appropriate.
85. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48 (“But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally 
thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to 
have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.  .  .  . Although [the FAA’s] saving clause 
preserves generally applicable contract defenses, .  .  .  [it] cannot in reason be construed as allowing a 
common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions 
of the act.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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 Secure in the knowledge that bilateral-arbitration agreements in consumer 
adhesion contracts are virtually impervious to statutory and common-law contract 
defenses,86 enterprises can let the practical effects of such agreements discourage 
individual consumer actions. While arbitration is potentially cheaper than litigation, 
it is not free. And the private nature of arbitration generally means that claimants 
cannot share information or otherwise pool their resources—even consumers with 
identical claims must individually bear the costs associated with discovery, experts, 
drafting, and so forth.87 Meanwhile, “rational lawyer[s]” will not represent individual 
claims where potential awards and fees are relatively small.88 Thus, in cases like 
Concepcion involving small amounts of money, the cost-benefit analysis usually 
weighs against pursuing individual claims: “The realistic alternative to a class action 
is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a 
fanatic sues for $30.”89
 To summarize, enterprises can—and will—use adhesion contracts to their 
advantage and to consumers’ disadvantage. And legislatures, as well as the courts, 
have recognized that, in certain instances, consumers should be protected from such 
opportunistic behavior. But the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA 
undermines consumer protection by allowing enterprises to insulate themselves from 
consumer claim liability and it’s “too darn bad.”
iV. dE-fEdEraLizing thE faa
 The Supreme Court has made it clear that limitations on FAA preemption will 
not come from the Court, regardless of the “dictates of justice or social desirability.”90 
Furthermore, the FAA’s preemptive scope, as construed in Concepcion, prevents state 
legislatures and, effectively, state and federal courts from invalidating arbitration 
agreements. As such, the only body potentially willing and able to act is Congress. 
This note contends that Congress should amend the FAA to allow state legislatures 
86. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 Or. L. Rev. 729, 730–31 
(2012) (“Perhaps the most common criticism [of the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence] is that this 
simple procedural statute enacted to require enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court has 
been transformed  .  .  . into a source of substantive federal arbitration law that governs and favors the 
enforcement of virtually every arbitration agreement . . . and displaces otherwise applicable state law.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2314 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). For 
example, in Italian Colors Restaurant, an arbitration clause required bilateral arbitration and prohibited 
the plaintiffs from formally or informally sharing information and, therefore, precluded them from 
splitting the cost of the expert report that was required for their antitrust claims. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). The cost of the expert report would have potentially eclipsed $1,000,000, but recovery for 
individual plaintiffs would not have exceeded $40,000. Id. at 2308. While that case is an extreme 
example due to the nature of the claim, it illustrates the Hobson’s choice that consumers often face.
88. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 699 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
90. See Kessler, supra note 1, at 637; see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
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to govern the enforceability of arbitration agreements.91 Such an amendment would 
allow states, consistent with principles of federalism, to strike the proper balance 
between freedom of contract and the need for consumer protection. And, as a 
practical matter, such an amendment would be more likely to succeed in limiting the 
scope of the FAA than any existing efforts.92
 The Constitution embodies principles of federalism, imposing limits on the 
federal government and reserving “substantial sovereign authority” to the states.93 In 
addition to acting as a check on federal power:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous 
advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive 
to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation 
and experimentation in government; and it makes government more 
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.94
Historically, these values have weighed heavily in favor of upholding state authority 
“in subject matter areas traditionally occupied by the states,”95 which include contract 
law.96 But, as discussed in Part III, the FAA precludes state legislatures from 
exercising their traditional authority over contract law to the extent that it frustrates 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
 Amending the FAA to reverse its preemptive effect on state statutes governing 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements would restore federalism values that have 
been marginalized by the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.97 First, every state—in 
response to the needs of its citizens—has enacted consumer protection laws,98 but 
FAA preemption allows enterprises to insulate themselves from many of the effects 
of such laws by simply including arbitration agreements in their consumer adhesion 
contracts. In this way, federal law gives enterprises more control over the rights of 
consumers than the states in which they live. Providing state legislatures with the 
authority to determine when and under what circumstances arbitration agreements 
91. This amendment would only affect § 2 of the FAA, which governs the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. It would not alter the remaining provisions concerning stays, orders to compel, appointment 
of arbitrators, vacatur or confirmation of awards, etc. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2013).
92. See infra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
93. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
94. Id. at 458.
95. Kristopher Kleiner, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion: The Disappearance of the Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 747, 750 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (describing how Southland Corp. v. Keating and its progeny run contrary to federalism principles 
and the Supreme Court’s usual application of the preemption doctrine).
96. Brunet et al., supra note 41, at 63; see also David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: 
Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 129, 138–39 
(2004).
97. See Brunet et al., supra note 41, at 63.
98. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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should be enforced—and when they should yield to contrary state policy—would 
reverse this perverse result.
 Second, moving the arbitration debate back to the state level would increase 
opportunities for interested parties to inf luence arbitration policy and legislation. 
Enterprises and their allies have deep pockets and generally have little problem 
lobbying federal representatives for favorable legislation, but individuals and 
consumer-rights advocates are typically not as well funded and, thus, stand a better 
chance of being heard by state lawmakers. And, while relegating the debate to state 
legislatures would increase the cost of legislative advocacy across all fifty states, it 
would decrease the costs and resources needed to effect change in any one state.99 
Stakeholders are also more likely to actively engage in the state legislative arena 
where they have a chance of success,100 as opposed to lobbying Congress where 
partisan politics and special interest groups make the legislative process far more 
cumbersome.101 Thus, de-federalizing arbitration policy would ensure that parties on 
both sides of the debate have meaningful opportunities to influence legislation and 
that the democratic process is, in fact, democratic.
 Third, the states are best suited to “serve as . . . laborator[ies]”102 and test creative 
solutions to the adhesion-contract and arbitration-agreement problem, for which 
there is currently no clear solution. Pro-enterprise advocates may argue that giving 
this power to the states is just opening the door for state legislatures to frustrate the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. But, given the proliferation of arbitration 
agreements in recent decades,103 as well as the potential and realized benefits of 
arbitration and standardized contracts,104 foreclosing arbitration entirely would be 
regressive and unlikely to succeed.105 More likely, state legislatures would balance the 
benefits of arbitration against the need to safeguard consumer interests. For example, 
political parties might gridlock on the issue of class arbitration, but class arbitration 
is not the only way to make pursuing small consumer claims worthwhile: joinder, 
consolidation, and other means of information sharing can also decrease the burden 
99. See Brunet et al., supra note 41, at 183 (“State-by-state regulation may be the most feasible [option] to 
the extent that business interests control the legislature . . . .”).
100. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws to prohibit employment discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Human 
Rights Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-
discrimination-act (last updated Mar. 9, 2015). Meanwhile, it will likely take years for Congress to pass 
parallel federal protections. See H.R. 1755 (113th): Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, 
GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1755#overview (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
101. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 115–23.
102. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
103. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 18–30, 72–75 and accompanying text.
105. Consider, for example, how little support the sweeping Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) has received in 
Congress. See infra text accompanying notes 115–23 (linking the AFA’s repeated failure in Congress to 
broad language that would eliminate the enforcement of arbitration agreements in specific contexts).
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on individual consumers and encourage the pursuit of individual claims.106 Likewise 
for shifting some or all costs associated with consumer arbitration to the enterprise; 
requiring arbitration in a location convenient for the consumer; and ensuring that 
consumers have access to appropriate remedies, including injunctions and punitive 
damages.107 Arguably, mandatory arbitration can be structured to account for 
disparate bargaining power so that consumers with small claims will actually fare 
better in arbitration than litigation, while enterprises continue to enjoy the benefits 
of standardized arbitration agreements.108 Finding the right balance, though, will 
require trial and error, and the states, being more f lexible and less dangerous than 
the federal government,109 are the appropriate place for such experimentation.
 Of course, this will mean that the enforceability of arbitration agreements will 
vary from state to state, and enterprises will have to adjust their standardized 
contracts accordingly—an inefficient and burdensome process.110 But contract law 
has always been the province of the states, and enterprises have developed methods 
of addressing jurisdictional variations.111 Also, enterprises will not bear the entirety 
of this additional burden: The expenses will be factored into the cost of doing 
business and passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Consumers may 
have to pay slightly more for a good or service, but they will be protected from the 
unexpected and unrecoverable losses concomitant with the abuse of standardized 
contracts. Further, it is unlikely that each of the fifty states will adopt unique laws 
106. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
107. For example, the arbitration agreement challenged in Concepcion was arguably fair to consumers. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). It required AT&T to “pay all costs for non-
frivolous claims,” required the arbitration to “take place in the county in which the customer [was] 
billed,” and allowed the arbitrator to “award any form of individual relief.” Id.
108. See generally Steven C. Bennett, The Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act: Problems and Alternatives, Disp. 
Resol. J., May–July 2012, at 32, 37 (arguing that arbitration may be better than litigation for consumers 
with small claims); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act 
and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 457, 494–95 (2011) (noting 
that the Association of Conflict Resolution has identified benefits for consumers in certain arbitration 
processes).
109. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
110. See Brunet et al., supra note 41, at 182.
111. See id. at 182. “Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government.” 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008). For example, every state has Blue Sky Laws that 
operate in conjunction with federal securities laws. Robert Rapp, Blue Sky Regulation: A Primer for 
Accredited Investors, Accredited Investor Markets, http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/
ai-basics/securities-laws-for-beginners/blue-sky-regulation-a-primer-for-accredited-investors/ (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2015). While each state’s laws are modeled on the same basic principles, entities involved 
in issuing, buying, or selling securities must ensure compliance in each state independently. Id. Likewise, 
any employer operating in more than one state must ensure compliance with the wage and hour laws of 
each state, in addition to federal wage and hour laws. See, e.g., Minimum Wage Laws in the States—
January 1, 2015, U.S. Dep’t Labor, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last updated Feb. 
24, 2015) (providing interactive graphic with the minimum wage requirements for all fifty states).
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governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. States may co-opt legislation 
from one another, with or without variations;112 they may draw from the same 
authorities;113 or they may adopt all or part of a model code drafted by the Uniform 
Law Commission, as with the Uniform Arbitration Act.114
 In addition to promoting principles of federalism, amending the FAA to grant 
power to the states has the practical benefit of being more likely to succeed where 
previously proposed amendments have failed. To date, the most prominent attempt 
to limit the FAA has been the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), first introduced in 
2007 and then reintroduced in 2009, 2011, and 2013.115 Each time the bill failed to 
112. Consider, for example, how Washington State’s youth concussion legislation was co-opted by many 
other states (albeit to poor effect). See generally Erin P. Andrews, Avoiding the Technical Knockout: 
Tackling the Inadequacies of Youth Concussion Legislation, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 417 (2013–2014). 
Similarly, after Florida enacted its “Stand Your Ground” law in 2005, many other states adopted 
identical or similar statutes. Marc Fisher & Dan Eggen, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Coincide with Jump in 
Justifiable-Homicide Cases, Wash. Post (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
stand-your-ground-laws-coincide-with-jump-in-justifiable-homicide-cases/2012/04/07/gIQAS2v51S_
story.html. More recently, after California enacted the country’s first “affirmative consent” law, other 
states began proposing similar laws. Ashe Schow, Affirmative Consent Laws Spreading Across the US, 
Wash. Examiner (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/affirmative-consent-laws-
spreading-across-the-us/article/2554754. 
113. For example, the American Law Institute is currently drafting a third Restatement of the Law, Consumer 
Contracts, which will focus “on aspects of the law unique to consumer contracts and on regulatory 
techniques that are prominently applied in consumer protection law.” Current Projects: Restatement of the 
Law, Consumer Contracts, Am. L. Inst., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_
ip&projectid=25 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). Given the prestige and inf luence of the American Law 
Institute and the existing restatements, state legislators drafting consumer protection laws would likely 
consult such secondary sources.
114. Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf. As of this 
writing, eighteen states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), with three more states having 
introduced it for adoption. Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (2000), Uniform L. Commission, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2015). The drafters of the 2000 revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Act were very 
aware of the “significant and preemptive presence of the [FAA]” and drafted the revisions to avoid 
preemption. Arbitration Act (2000) Summary, Uniform L. Commission, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
ActSummary.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20%282000%29 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). Thus, if the 
FAA were amended, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would likely 
revisit the Uniform Arbitration Act in whole or in part to revise it accordingly.
115. S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 931, 111th Con. (2009); H.R. 1020, 
111th Cong. (2009); S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 878, 113th Cong. 
(2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). An alternative attempt—the Fair Arbitration Act—would have 
required arbitration clauses to contain certain procedural safeguards to be enforceable. S. 1135, 110th 
Cong. (2007); S. 1186, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was introduced in the Senate in 2007 and 
reintroduced in 2011 and died in committee both times. S. 1135; S. 1186; see also S. 1135 (110th): Fair 
Arbitration Act of 2007, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1135 (last visited Apr. 
25, 2015); S. 1186 (112th): Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/112/s1186 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
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make it out of committee,116 partly due to its broad language and sweeping effect.117 
If enacted, the AFA would institute a wholesale reversal of the FAA with respect to 
consumer, employment, antitrust, and civil rights disputes118—categories that do not 
have precise legal meanings—and would thus categorically invalidate pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements without the benefit of case-by-case consideration.119 While 
the measure is supported by some Democrats, it has garnered little to no Republican 
support.120 The 2013 bill died in Congress like its predecessors,121 which was 
unsurprising given that, as of November 2013, GovTrack.us estimated that the bill 
had a 44% chance of leaving committee with a 6% chance of passing in the Senate,122 
and a 9% chance of leaving committee with a 3% chance of passing in the House.123
 Yet Congress has passed legislation limiting the FAA in certain, specific 
instances, such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010.124 This suggests that amending the FAA in a less expansive way would 
be more likely to gain traction. Accordingly, instead of adopting the AFA’s wholesale 
repudiation of arbitration, this note argues for an amendment reinstating the states’ 
traditional control over contract law. Such an amendment would ref lect a more 
measured approach than the AFA because it would not automatically produce 
substantive changes in the law. Rather, any future limitations on the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements would come from duly elected state legislatures. Thus, federal 
lawmakers who reject the AFA as anti-business may nonetheless support an 
116. See Bennett, supra note 108, at 35 (“That the AFA has been introduced repeatedly in Congress without 
progressing past the committee stage suggests that the legislation lacks any real chance of adoption.”). 
The 2013 bill is pending but unlikely to pass. See infra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
117. See Cole, supra note 108, at 491–97.
118. See S. 1782; H.R. 3010; S. 931; H.R. 1020; S. 987; H.R. 1873; S. 878; H.R. 1844.
119. See S. 1782; H.R. 3010; S. 931; H.R. 1020; S. 987; H.R. 1873; S. 878; H.R. 1844; see also Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of 
American Arbitration, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 323, 402 (2012) (arguing that, while limiting the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements “may be appropriate in the context of certain categories of 
contracts that are normally adhesive, such as employment or consumer contracts, it is wholly inconsistent 
with expectations in the typical business-to-business setting”).
120. See Bennett, supra note 108, at 35 (“Republican control of the House is a factor disfavoring passage.”).
121. H.R. 1844 (113th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/hr1844 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013); S. 878 (113th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, GovTrack, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s878 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). As of the date of 
publication, GovTrack.us has been updated to omit the passage-rate estimates due to the bill’s failure to 
make it past the committee level.
122. S. 878 (113th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, supra note 121.
123. H.R. 1844 (113th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, supra note 121. The AFA has yet to be introduced in 
the 114th Congress. See Text of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/113/s878/text (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
124. Bennett, supra note 108, at 35–36 (describing three legislative proposals passed in 2009 that limit the 
FAA’s reach in certain employment and consumer settings).
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amendment that promotes states’ rights and limits federal power, consistent with 
their political agendas.125
 Lastly, proposing a less expansive amendment is more likely to lead to real 
discussion: the AFA’s all-or-nothing approach is not an invitation to negotiate. For 
both sides of the aisle to support a bill, there must be room—and a genuine 
willingness—to compromise. An amendment proposal granting states authority to 
legislate the enforceability of arbitration agreements would signal an interest in 
bargaining because the amendment could take many shapes. For example, instead of 
applying to contracts in general, the amendment could be structured to grant states 
control over specific categories of contracts, the definitions of which would also be 
subject to negotiation. Alternatively, instead of allowing states to legislate the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements for all claims, state authority could be limited 
to cases where an individual’s potential recovery falls below a certain dollar amount 
(i.e., an amount in controversy), also to be negotiated. In short, there is plenty of 
room for movement between repealing the FAA and “too darn bad,” and a serious 
proposal should welcome that debate.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 Recall that when Kessler prophesied about the dangers of adhesion contracts, it 
was 1943. There were no credit cards or credit card agreements, no computers or 
software licenses, no cell phones or service contracts—the world was, in many ways, 
a very different place. But the fundamental motivations of enterprises and consumers, 
rooted as they are in human nature, have not changed. And so, seven decades later, 
Kessler’s observations concerning freedom of contract have lost none of their validity 
or force:
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of 
competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has 
changed radically. Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not 
guarantee that all members of the community will be able to make use of it to 
the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by protecting the unequal 
distribution of property, does nothing to prevent freedom of contract from 
becoming a one-sided privilege.126
 In many—perhaps even most—ways, courts heeded Kessler’s warning all those 
years ago and took measures to temper the economic benefits of arbitration with 
fairness and equity. Today, though, much of the law that was developed as a bulwark 
against the exploitation of consumers has been dismantled by the Supreme Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the FAA. With respect to consumer adhesion contracts, 
enterprises can benefit at the expense of the consumer, with the full support and 
125. See Brunet et al., supra note 41, at 181 (“[Amending the FAA] to allow states to regulate with respect 
to consumer arbitration . . . will appeal to those legislators who favor states’ rights and oppose extensive 
federal interference with business matters.”)
126. Kessler, supra note 1, at 640.
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protection of federal law, provided they remember to include carefully crafted 
arbitration agreements in their consumer adhesion contracts.127
 For consumers, then, freedom of contract is again an illusion and it’s “too darn 
bad.” But it does not have to be. Congress has the power to amend the FAA and give 
state legislatures the authority to protect consumers. Such an amendment would be 
consistent with the ideals of federalism and a more realistic response to the problem 
because it would allow state legislatures to impose workable limitations on arbitration 
agreements by restoring the balance between enterprises and consumers within an 
appropriately democratic framework. Seventy years ago, when Kessler cautioned 
against allowing the disparity between enterprises and individuals to go unchecked, 
the courts responded. Now, to ensure that enterprises and consumers alike can 
prosper, Congress must do the same.
127. See Gilles, supra note 77 (“[F]irms will ultimately act in their economic best interests, and those interests 
dictate that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure to class action liability [by including class 
waivers in consumer contracts]. Why wouldn’t they? Once the waivers gain broader acceptance and 
recognition, it will become malpractice for corporate counsel not to include such clauses in consumer 
and other class-action-prone contracts.” (footnote omitted)).
